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 In his valuable contribution to this Symposium, Richard Pierce underscores the role ACUS 
has played over the years in encouraging on-the-ground fact-finding by its consultants, who have 
usually been academics consulted at the beginning of careers that ever after would be marked by 
this encounter with the realities of the administrative process.  As the mentee of Walter Gellhorn, 
who directed the remarkable empirical studies of federal agency procedures that underlay the 
eventual Administrative Procedure Act and who was a member of the ACUS Council from its 
initiation in 1964 until its end, perhaps its most active member, it is easy to agree.  My own first 
serious essay into administrative law scholarship, arranged by Walter, was an ACUS project that 
placed me for two months at the BLM offices in Denver, Colorado, observing how policy 
decisions concerning land use issues happened to arise in both adjudications and rulemakings – 
and learning that the prevailing supposition that agencies chose from the top which of these 
procedural routes to pursue was (at least there) unrealistic.1
                                                 
*  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Senior Fellow, Administrative Conference of the United 
States. 
  Not unimportantly, the empirical 
research ACUS has promoted – like mine, like Professor Pierce’s, and like the others’ he 
recounts – has been research requiring physical presence and observation – interviews, facts on 
the ground more than the disembodied data sets that fuel the “empirical” research of economists 
and many political scientists.  Next to actually serving in an administrative agency – the deepest 
of educational experiences about the subject we teach – it is research like this that is most likely 
to free the young scholar from the illusion that administrative law is all about, as Louis Jaffe 
1  Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior 
Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 Colum.L.Rev. 1231 (1974).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2468589 
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once put it, “Judicial Control of Administrative Action.”  What a contribution, then, ACUS has 
made not only to improvements in the functioning of government, but also to the way in which 
administrative law is presented in law school classrooms, and written about in the academic 
literature. 
 Reading Professor Pierce’s analysis, however, one is struck by the extent to which it reflects 
Professor Jaffe’s limited view. He properly uses as “an example of the value of empirical 
research understanding the rulemaking process,” and invokes what scholars have learned on the 
ground about the relative2 silence of the period preceding the notice of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking with which the APA’s stated procedure essentially begins.   Pre-notice processes, he 
demonstrates, are typically much longer than the period following notice.  For Professor Pierce, 
consideration of the prevalence of meetings with the regulated, and not regulatory beneficiaries, 
during this dark period, plus the consequence that proposals will then inevitably reflect hard-
fought compromises that will prove difficult for the public notice-and-comment period to 
dislodge, is a source of considerable concern.3
                                                 
2  The availability in recent years of a biennial Regulatory Agenda and annual Regulatory Plan suggests that, 
even apart from the active or accidental publicity agencies have always given of their future rulemaking plans, 
structural information about potential rulemakings not yet noticed for comment is now regularly available, and 
Presidents and others have strongly encouraged affirmative outreach to potentially affected interests during this 
period.  Congress’s enactment of a negotiated rulemaking process, 5 U.S.C. 661 et seq., is to the same effect, as the 
negotiations entailed are in formal terms to develop a consensual proposal for rulemaking, not a rule as such. 
  Then, addressing possible sources of pro-
3  For agencies like the EPA, who regularly hear from committed NGOs (as, for EPA, environmentalist NGOs 
like the Natural Resources Defense Council), the street may have more two-way traffic than his analysis suggests.  
See Coral Davenport, “Taking Oil Industry Cue, Environmentalists Drew Emissions Blueprint Order,” The New 
York Times, July 7, 2014, p. A9, available at http://nyti.ms/1ziAtnd (visited July 16, 2014). It appears that, 
responding to agency bureaucrats’ fears of the results of administration change in both liberal and conservative 
3 
regulated bias in these outcomes, he suggests only four: first, the collective action problems that 
the public, a diffuse multitude, must inevitably face in relation to problems that have high stakes 
for small numbers on the other side; and then three lines of judicial decision.  Two, he argues, 
add to the importance of the pre-notice period by contributing to the vulnerability of rulemaking 
to changes made after a rulemaking proposal has been published for comment: judicial decisions 
defining the necessary content of notice, and judicial decisions demanding thorough reasoning 
about changes in statements of basis and purpose. Finally, by making it easier for the regulated 
than regulatory beneficiaries to seek review, he argues, judicial decisions on standing add to the 
influence the regulated have over rulemaking outcomes by underscoring the comments most 
important for the statement of basis and purpose to address.  The collective action problems are 
inescapable, but if these judicial decisions could be changed, he suggests, perhaps there could be 
more attention to the public interest. 
 Whatever the merit in these concerns, however, many administrative law scholars (including 
the author) believe that the most important influences on the duration, outcomes, and resulting 
rigidity in rulemaking proposals emerging from the pre-notice period come not directly from the 
regulated, but from agencies’ political overseers.  Thus, the pre-notice period that underlies 
Professor Pierce’s analysis also troubles Professor Lisa Heinzerling in a forthcoming Texas Law 
Review analysis, “Classical Administrative Law in the Era of Presidential Administration.”  
(“Presidential Administration.” in her title refers to an influential analysis penned by Justice 
                                                                                                                                                             
administrations, even opposing pressures from elsewhere within a current administration, interest groups have 
brought agency-“friendly” suits during the pendency of policy determinations, resulting in settlements favorable to 
the then prevailing agency preferences. Stephen M. Johnson, Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen 
Suit, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 891, 897-99 (2014). 
4 
Kagan shortly after her return from the White House to Harvard Law School,4
 Unlike Professor Pierce, Professor Heinzerling is worried not about the impacts of judicial 
control of administrative action, but about the consequences of its absence.  The single judicial 
 celebrating the 
steady growth of presidential controls over executive agency rulemakings during the preceding 
three decades and, particularly, in the Clinton administration she served.)  For Professor 
Heinzerling, long a critic of White House involvement (in EPA rulemaking in particular), the 
loud and controlling voices during the pre-notice period, the transformative impacts, come  from 
the White House – often, to be sure, reflecting industry interests, but now as the heavy, directly 
political thumb of superior authority.  Since the Reagan administration, the White House Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has been responsible for oversight of cost-benefit 
analyses required of all executive agencies in advance of important rulemakings – today, under 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, as slightly modified by the Obama Administration.  
For important rulemakings, these required analyses (and others Congress or the White House 
have required) are dominant influences during the pre-notice period, and have given it a strongly 
secretive and political character, not one that is assuredly transparent and technocratic as 
classical administrative law assumes it will be.  As she writes, “it seems clear today that there are 
many [political] somebodies who matter and who are empowered to delay or stop agency 
initiatives.” “[T]he secrecy and coziness of presidential administration stand in sharp contrast to 
the transparency and inclusiveness of classical administrative law.”  Attention to the impact of 
these governmental political inputs from outside the agency is surprisingly missing from 
Professor Pierce’s analysis. 
                                                 
4  114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001). 
5 
development she blames for the dominance and politicality of the prenotice period in rulemaking 
is the D.C. Circuit’s influential opinion in Sierra Club v. Costle.5
 Perhaps we should be happier to attribute the distortions and rigidities unquestionably 
resulting from the pre-notice period, just as Professor Pierce argues, if they can be attributed to 
White House interventions rather than the interventions of interested industrial forces.  In his 
peroration, he raises the possibility that the public interest might actually be served by the impact 
of forces external to a single-purpose agency, over-zealous to promote its particular, but limited, 
public responsibility and obtuse to other important considerations that may be at play.  To be 
sure, OIRA meets with outsiders just as agencies do; as Professor Heinzerling observes, those 
meetings are predominantly with the regulated just as agency meetings with outsiders are, 
although on her account the disproportion is much lower;
  Written by a judge (Patricia 
Wald) who served as Assistant Attorney General for legislative affairs during the Carter 
administration, and so would have frequently dealt with the White House, this influential opinion 
professes indifference to the possibility that political influence might actually and silently have 
influenced EPA’s choices among alternatives in an important and complex rulemaking, so long 
as those choices were supported by a statement of basis and purpose relying on the information 
the agency had, and an ostensible reasoned decision-making process.  In a 100-page exemplar of 
hard look review, she found the agency’s public reasoning process adequate and the chance that 
it might have been influenced by the President immaterial. 
6
                                                 
5  657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 and OIRA’s limited transparency 
6  She reports a 5:1 ratio, in contrast to his estimate of 14:1 for the Volcker rulemakings, 170:1 for the EPA.  
And see n.  above. 
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reveals only attendees, and not what might have been said.  But then any resulting interventions 
in agency processes, and there are many, come with White House imprimatur.  Countering 
agency tunnel vision stands alongside the President’s constitutional responsibility for assuring 
the faithful execution of the laws as an important rationale for the executive orders under which 
OIRA functions.  The possibility that OIRA’s unmentioned engagement during the pre-notice 
period is in fact the dominant source of its impacts thus could validate Professor Pierce’s 
speculations.  It seems at least possible that these interventions bespeak not special interest bias, 
but the electorally validated voice of the overall public interest. 
 This may serve to suggest that empirical study of agencies’ relations with their overseers 
would – even should – be a rich field for ACUS’s work.  Recalling my own experience as an 
agency general counsel almost four decades ago, after having taught “classical administrative 
law” for four years, I remember the shock of coming to understand that my (independent) 
agency’s relationships to the courts had so much less impact on its day-to-day functioning than 
its relations with the White House, the Congress, and their associated bureaucracies.  Judicial 
review is not unimportant; at least when it can come from both the left and the right – as 
Professor Pierce persuasively argued in his defense of pre-enforcement review of rulemaking 
against its critics7
                                                 
7  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59,, 89-91 
(eliminating pre-enforcement review would deossify rulemaking “at a social cost [that is] intolerably high. ... 
Asymmetric access to judicial review ... would introduce a powerful systematic anti-regulatory bias in the 
implementation of all regulatory systems.”)  
 – it has the tendency to keep agencies honest, to free them from the temptation 
only to appease the one side of the issues under consideration that is likely to appeal.  But as 
7 
Professor Heinzerling argues, Sierra Club appears to give presidential influence free reign within 
the possibilities an agency’s rulemaking record leaves open to its judgment.   
 OIRA’s administration of impact analyses for individual rulemaking proposals under E.O. 
12866 is only one among the many important hierarchical controls within the executive branch.  
OIRA also controls agency rulemaking agendas and agency information practices.  Inspectors 
general constantly explore issues of legality, efficiency and waste.  Special Counsel of the Small 
Business Administration monitors adherence to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by 
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).  The Administrative 
Procedure Act calls on the Director of the Office of the Federal Register to control agency 
incorporation by reference of industrial standards, converting them into legal obligations whose 
texts are not directly made public.  OMB controls agency budgets; other agencies control office 
space and materiel, or the allocation of positions in the Senior Executive Service.  And so forth.  
These are not judicial controls, but anyone who has spent time in an administrative agency 
understands how profoundly they influence the conduct of its business.  And, save for impact 
analysis issues under Section 6 of E.O. 12866 (and its predecessors), few of them have been 
significant subjects of empirical study in the literature.  
 From Congress, political pressures can raise similar issues, whether exercised through 
budgetary controls, oversight hearings, or personal interventions.  The Congressional Review 
Act, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and others, provide general contexts in which 
congressional pressures might be felt.  The Government Accountability Office, a congressional 
agency, has auditors permanently stationed in government agencies, patrolling their corridors for 
waste and inefficiencies in the use of appropriated funds and generating reports that command 
8 
immediate agency attention.  One may hope that these influences will be brought to bear with 
integrity, with an embracive eye to genuine public interest, and not simply for political 
advantage; but this is hardly inevitable.  And, again, the empirical literature on these issues is 
quite thin.  Both the public and the agencies represented in ACUS’s Assembly could be well 
served by empirical studies addressed to oversight relationships, as well as agency internal 
functioning. 
 One perhaps ought not, however, be surprised to find that here ACUS’s record has been a 
mixed one, strongly preferring issues that can be addressed at the level of agency action, and 
hesitant to speak to issues about the government’s internal processes for supervision and political 
control.  Its assembly is a mix of academicians, private practitioners and agency lawyers with the 
latter in the majority.  The opportunity that agency lawyers have to reason with each other about 
shared operational issues is one of the ACUS’s major benefits.  Recommendations that speak to 
the agency level provide that benefit, readily imagined as exercises in mutual support.  To be 
sure, agencies also share frustrations with their overseers.  Yet making common cause on issues 
involving one’s political overseers has an adversary as well as a cooperative element.  
Discouragement to pursue such inquiries might come from political loyalties, from fears of the 
consequences of criticizing powerful superiors and – perhaps particularly – from the leadership 
of ACUS itself.  The President selects the ACUS  Council, which initially approves projects and 
eventually shapes recommendations for Assembly consideration, and today’s Council includes 
both the present and the next previous General Counsel of OMB  Although its Chair serves a 
fixed term suggesting significant possibilities of independence, he is also a presidential appointee 
and – as important – necessarily relies on White House for support in many respects.  Even 
9 
though ACUS is very modestly funded by appropriations – and work suggesting the existence of 
inappropriate congressional political interactions with agencies or limiting principles for those 
interactions would be unlikely to prompt increases in them – its defunding by Congress 1995-
2010 was heralded as a budget-saving measure.  Given this history and these vulnerabilities, 
perhaps a gun-shy attitude is simply to be expected.  It is simply easier, less freighted, to 
structure inquiries that lack a potentially adversarial, critical edge.  Yet there is then a limit, 
however understandable, to the empiricism ACUS encourages – a limit that tends to exclude 
what may in fact be the more important influences on agency actions. 
  During its first period of activity, 1968-95, ACUS spoke often to Congress, but rarely to its 
other overseers, and not at all to some – for example, the GAO, or the Council on Environmental 
Quality that one could imagine frequently influencing agency actions.  Thus, of the 208 
recommendations or statements it made during its first period of activity, half included a 
recommendation to Congress for legislative action, but only 11 made recommendations to the 
courts, and 18 to elements of the White House establishment, including OMB.8
                                                 
8  Thanks to Logan Gowdey, CLS ‘16 and Andrew Sutton, CLS ‘16, for thoughtfully and carefully coding them 
all. 
  Of these 18, few 
placed ACUS in the position of recommending changes that, while favorable to agency interests, 
might have been regarded by the White House as critical of its conduct in relation to them.   The 
first time ACUS called its work a “Statement” rather than “Recommendations,” in 1971, it was 
to express disagreement with the Ash Council, appointed by President Nixon, which had 
recommended converting some independent commissions into executive agencies, and 
10 
increasing the judiciailization of some processes.9  Not until 1980 did it again speak to the EOP, 
recommending changes in implementing the Advisory Committee Act10 and generally 
supporting the confidentiality of White House communications with agencies during 
rulemaking11 – as Judge Wald would reiterate for the D.C. Circuit the following year.12  It was 
another eight years before ACUS would develop suggestions arguably critical of the work of 
transition teams between administrations13 and controversial respecting valuation issues in cost-
benefit analysis,14 and its transparency and extent.15  In 1990, ACUS sought to advise President 
and Congress both on the handling of executive privilege disputes,16
                                                 
9 ACUS Statement No. 1, Views of the Administrative Conference on the “Report on Selected Independent 
Regulatory Agencies” of the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, 2 ACUS 27 (May 7, 1971). 
 but the following year it 
treated as an agency matter only “Federal Agency Cooperation with Foreign Government 
10  ACUS Recommendation 80-3, Interpretation and Implementation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
45 Fed. Reg. 46,775 (July 11, 1980). 
11  ACUS Recommendation 80-6, Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 45 
Fed. Reg. 86,407 (Dec. 31, 1980). 
12  See n.5 above 
13  ACUS Recommendation 88-1, Presidential Transition Workers’ Code of Ethical Conduct, 53 Fed. Reg. 
26,026 (July 11, 1988). 
14  ACUS Recommendation 88-7, Valuation of Human Life in Regulatory Decisionmaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,586 
(Oct. 11, 1988). 
15  ACUS Recommendation 88-9, Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 5207 (Feb. 2, 
1988). 
16  ACUS Recommendation 90-7, Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Sensitive 
Information, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,272 (Dec. 28, 1990). 
11 
Regulators.”17  In its final years, inter alia, it asked the President to create a body to coordinate 
services to migrant workers,18 to streamline the cost-benefit analysis process to reduce its 
burdensomeness,19 and to establish a mechanism for prioritizing the review of aging 
regulations.20
 ACUS has brought 29 studies to the point of adopted recommendations and statements since 
its revival in 2010.  Twelve of these were necessarily addressed to the agency level only.  Two 
were addressed in whole or in part to the courts, involving no political sensibilities.
 
21  No 
recommendation spoke to informal congressional interaction with agencies or the work of the 
GAO, but of nine that one thinks might reasonably have made legislative recommendations to 
Congress,22 and perhaps reflecting its dysfunctionality today, only four23
                                                 
17  ACUS Recommendation 91-1, Federal Agency Cooperation with Foreign Government Regulators, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 33,842 (July 24, 1991). 
  did.  ACUS had no 
18ACUS Recommendation 92-4, Coordination of Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Service Programs, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 30,106 (July 8, 1992). 
19  ACUS Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 4670 (Feb. 
1, 1994), correction at 59 Fed. Reg. 8507 (Feb. 22, 1994). 
20  ACUS Recommendation 95-3, Review of Existing Agency Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,109 (Aug 18, 
1995). 
21   Legal Considerations in E-Rulemaking;  Recommendation 2011-1(content of records on review);  Remand 
Without Vacatur; Recommendation 2013-6 (supporting existing judicial remedy), 
22   The Federal Advisory Committee Act - Issues and Proposed Reforms, Recommendation 2011-7; Review of 
Regulatory Analysis Requirements, Recommendation 2012-1, Midnight Rules, Recommendation 2012-2; 
Paperwork Reduction Act, Recommendation 2012-4; Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, 
Recommendation 2012-5; Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 1500, Recommendation 2012-6; Inflation Adjustment Act, 
12 
recommendations to make to Congress about Review of Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 
Midnight Rules, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, the Government in 
the Sunshine Act, or “Ex Parte” Communications in Informal Rulemaking.   
 Notice, however, the higher degree of political sensitivity generally attaching to these issues 
than to those on which ACUS did speak to Congress.  The omissions were sometimes quite 
deliberate.24  “Government in the Sunshine Act,” Recommendation 2014-2,25
                                                                                                                                                             
Recommendation 2012-8; Government in the Sunshine Act; Recommendation 2014-2; and  “Ex Parte” 
Communications in Informal Rulemaking, Recommendation 2014-4. 
 took its impetus 
from the known effect of the Act in reducing collegiality and politically responsible joint action 
on multi-member commissions.  ACUS had received a study to this effect just before its 1995 
suspension of operations, too late to act upon, and renewed study confirmed it.  Yet despite the 
considerable evidence of this effect before ACUS’s Committee on Regulation and a recent 
statute favoring the FCC in this respect, Conference officials thought it too unlikely to be 
productive to warrant legislative proposals.  Concerning review of regulatory analysis 
requirements, a hot-button issue with major impacts on contemporary rulemaking, it satisfied 
itself with a prefatory comment (i.e., neither a recommendation nor a statement, that would 
promote staff follow-through)  
23  The Federal Advisory Committee Act - Issues and Proposed Reforms, Recommendation 2011-7; Paperwork 
Reduction Act, Recommendation 2012-4; Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 1500, Recommendation 2012-6; Inflation 
Adjustment Act, Recommendation 2012-8. 
24  As the author is a member ACUS’s Committee on Regulation, and a frequent attender of its plenary sessions, 
many statements in this essay, like this one, are based on personal participation in ACUS proceedings.   
25  79 Fed. Reg. 35,990 (June 25, 2014). 
13 
“encourag[ing] the Executive  Office  of  the  President  and  Congress  to  consider  
consolidating  certain  analysis requirements to the extent overlap exists and to promote 
uniformity in the determination of whether any given analysis requirement applies.  Although 
the Conference seeks to assure that existing  analytic  requirements  are  applied  in  the  most  
efficient  and  transparent  manner possible, it does not address whether the number or nature 




Respecting “ex parte” communications in rulemaking, ACUS’s Recommendations explicitly 
excluded the possibility of issues arising from congressional communications from 
consideration.  Even when ACUS did speak to Congress, it did so with ultimate politeness.  
Ordinarily, its recommendations to agencies state what agencies “should” do.  In its 
recommendations on the Paperwork Reduction Act, the only “change” ACUS affirmatively 
recommended in the Act was to reconfigure OMB’s annual reporting obligations to reflect the 
ready availability of much of the information now required to be reported on government 
websites.  On more fraught issues – whether public participation should be streamlined for 
information demand renewals without significant change, or whether OMB could be permitted to 
grant some agency information demand requests requiring less scrutiny for five rather than three 
years – the ACUS recommendations asked Congress only to “look at” or “consider” possibilities 
of amendment. 
 Respecting executive branch relationships, too, ACUS has yet to undertake empirical 
analysis of some important oversight relationships that one might think quite fruitful, if arguably 
fraught – as, for example, OIRA’s oversight of regulatory plans under Section 4 of E.O. 12866.  
Presidential claims to coordinate agency activities (which have figured in other recent studies) 
and to set policy priorities are, if anything, stronger than its claims to oversee, perhaps control, 
                                                 
26  Recommendation 2012-1 at  
14 
particular rulemakings under E.O. 12866 Section 6; yet the administration of Section 4 has been 
virtually unexamined in the literature and is obviously a matter of considerable interest to 
agencies. Twelve of ACUS’s recent recommendations27 did or might have involved 
recommendations to executive branch actors (largely in the Executive Office of the President) as 
well as to agencies, and one also finds similar – occasionally more striking – patterns among 
them.  Four of these recommendations involved settings in which subordinated executive branch 
agencies were involved, EOP/agency cooperation was more likely than conflict, or (by reason of 
its command of foreign relations issues) EOP authority was clear; in these settings ACUS’s 
recommendations spoke quite directly.28  For all but one of the remaining eight,29
                                                 
27  Incorporation by Reference, Recommendation 2011-5; International Regulatory Cooperation, 
Recommendation 2011-6; The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Proposed Reforms, Recommendation 2011-7; 
Review of Regulatory Analysis Requirements, Recommendation 2012-1; Midnight Rules, Recommendation 2012-2; 
Paperwork Reduction Act, Recommendation 2012-4; Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, 
Recommendation 2012-5; Science in the Administrative Process, Recommendation 2013-3; GPRA Modernization 
Act of 2010: Examining Constraints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency Collaboration, Recommendation 
2013-7; Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review, Statement 18; Reducing FOIA Litigation through 
Targeted ADR Strategies, Recommendation 2014-1; and “Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking, 
Recommendation 2014-4. 
 the continuing 
28   International Regulatory Cooperation, Recommendation 2011-6; Improving Coordination of Related 
Agency Responsibilities, Recommendation 2012-5; GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Constraints to, 
and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency Collaboration, Recommendation 2013-7; Reducing FOIA Litigation through 
Targeted ADR Strategies, Recommendation 2014-1. 
29  Midnight Rules, Recommendation 2012-2, speaks directly to both incumbent and incoming presidential 
administrations about the somewhat fraught (but, the report suggests, often illusory ) appearance that outgoing 
15 
cautiousness of – even silences in – ACUS’s approach to executive branch overseers is quite 
striking. 
  For example, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) permits agencies to “incorporate by reference” into their 
regulations – that is, to convert into legal obligations – voluntary industrial standards non-
governmental organizations such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers develop 
(e.g., respecting requirements to assure boiler safety).  The binding legal requirements thus 
created cannot readily be known in the ways most law can be, however, either at the proposal 
stage or after they have become law.  While single print copies are maintained for inspection at 
the National Archives and at the adopting agency’s headquarters, persons interested to know the 
content of their legal obligations must ordinarily acquire the standards from the adopting NGO, 
at the cost and under the terms it chooses to set for them.30   The process risks undermining the 
usual rulemaking  procedure, since the standards are generated elsewhere and when 
incorporation is proposed the usual if not inevitable reality is that the text of the standard 
proposed to be adopted and any supporting materials are not themselves made public in the 
rulemaking.  This effect is particularly strong when, as OIRA guidance on the practice 
encourages,31
                                                                                                                                                             
administrations facing a change in political administration push through rulemakings they fear the incoming 
administration would prove unwilling to carry to completion.  The issue is self-evidently bipartisan, and the 
recommendations look in the direction of limiting the outgoing administration’s practice and enhancing the 
incoming administration’s controls. 
 agencies promote the development of a standard and its  officials are themselves 
30  For a general discussion of these issues, see Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public 
Law, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 497 (2013).   
31  OMB, Circular A-119. 
16 
participants in the NGO’s consensual processes.32
 ACUS recommendations on “Incorporation by Reference,” Recommendation  2011-5,
  Potential commenters who have not 
participated in the NGO process are then left substantially in the dark as to what the proposal is.  
Since the standard has already been finalized by its adopting standards organization, one could 
see this as an even more striking instance of the realities Professor Pierce addresses, with the 
rule-to-be essentially taking final form before even the deficient public notice characteristic of 
incorporation by reference has been given.  
33 
make numerous sensible recommendations to rulemaking agencies using this procedure, 
recommendations that are particularly likely to be effective in supplementing public awareness at 
the proposal/comment stage of rulemaking.  ACUS refused, however, to address a word to any of 
the three overseeing agencies – the Office of the Federal Register, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (in the Department of Commerce), and OIRA – that share 
responsibilities for controlling the practice, and that might, by revising their approaches, 
eliminate or at least substantially contain34
                                                 
32   For example, the notice of proposed rulemaking for the rule mentioned in n.  below, incorporating standards 
on pipeline hazard warning that had been developed by the American Petroleum Institute,  remarked that the API 
had undertaken to develop the standard at agency’s request, and that agency officials “attended all meetings of the 
force as observers and provided direction and input into both the process and the content of the standard.” 69 Fed. 
Reg. 35279, 35281 (June 24, 2004).   
 the offense thus given to the general principle that 
33  77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012) 
34  The offense is particularly strong when the matter incorporated is itself regulatory, as distinct from stating a 
technical means of complying with requirements that are independently and sufficiently stated in governing statutes 
or regulations.  When, for example, the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (now the Pipeline 
17 
law is not subject to copyright.  And this despite transformations worked by the information age 
that virtually compel revision of their outdated regulations and guidance documents.35
 ACUS’s cautiousness in addressing possibly fraught issues of executive oversight is 
particularly striking in the four recent ACUS recommendations or statements work touching on 
the pre-notice period in rulemaking, the very context that so concerns Professor Pierce.  Several 
of the ACUS recommendations from its initial period did forthrightly address sensitive issues 
arising in connection with the presidentially mandated impact analysis process,
  
36 that in one 
form or another has existed at least since the Carter administration.37
                                                                                                                                                             
and Hazardous Materials Administration) incorporated by reference standards developed by the American 
Petroleum Institute to govern required public warnings about pipeline hazards, 49 C.F.R. §192.616(a), one could not 
have regarded the standards as simply providing technical amplification of regulatory requirements on which the 
public would have had an independent opportunity to comment.  The existing statutes, regulations, and guidance all 
reflect this distinction, suggesting that incorporation by reference must be limited to technical matters, n.  above,  
but in practice this distinction has not been enforced.  The ACUS recommendations ignore it, and the current 
proposals, n.  below, explicitly eliminate any trace of it. 
   OIRA’s impact on 
35  The Office of the Federal Register’s regulations, 1 C.F.R. Part 51, were written in 1982, when the practice of 
incorporation protected the volume of the Federal Register and the C.F.R. from tens of thousands of additional 
printed pages – no longer a consideration in the era of agency electronic libraries.  OIRA’s Circular A-119 was 
generated in the Clinton Administration.  In probable consequence of a petition for rulemaking filed by the author 
and others, both are now proposed for revision. Http://Regulations.gov dockets OFR-2013-0001 and OMB-2014-
0001. 
36  See nn. ,  , and  above. 
37  E.O. 12044.  Presidents Nixon and Ford sought similar inquiries for important rules, but without establishing 
an executive order framework. 
18 
rulemaking, which largely occurs during this period, has long been a  major concern of academic 
administrative law literature.  At the agency level, if not inside OIRA with its revealed penchant 
for privacy,38 empirical research has been richly possible.39  In three of the recent four, ACUS 
declined to speak to OIRA’s role during this time; in none did it voice Professor Pierce’s concern 
with baleful influence by the regulated during that period.40
 Regulatory Analysis Requirements, Recommendation 2012-1,
 
41 was earlier discussed as an 
example of ACUS’s gentility in addressing Congress.42
                                                 
38  Too much of the literature reveals the extent to which OIRA has failed to carry through on promises of 
transparency that were an important element of the executive orders’ creation.  Mendleson 
   It acknowledged the concerns of many 
that proliferating impact analysis requirements contribute to the costs, sluggishness and resulting 
inflexibility of proposal generation.  That impact predominantly occurs in the pre-notice period.  
Yet while “ask[ing] the Executive Office of the President and Congress to consider  streamlining  
the  existing  regulatory  analysis  requirements, ... [the Recommendation] does not address 
whether the number or nature of those requirements might not be reduced in light of their 
39  Bressman and Vanderbergh; Wagner 
40  Note that the two recent studies Professor Pierce relies on for his analysis of the pre-notice period (Kimberly 
Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 53 (2013) 
and Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air 
Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin L. Rev. 99 (2011)) were not ACUS consultant studies.  Neither piece looks 
directly at OIRA’s impact, although the second (whose authors include Wendy Wagner, see text at n.  below) briefly 
asks whether its intervention might possibly counteract the internal effects of the unbalanced levels of direct 
communications by industry with EPA, and expresses considerable doubt about that.  
41  77 Fed. Reg. 47,801 (August 10, 012). 
42  See text at n above 
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cumulative impact on agencies.”  “Asking to consider” is a considerably gentler tack than ACUS 
recommendations generally take. 
 ‘Ex Parte’ Communications in Informal Rulemaking, Recommendation 2014-4,43 also 
discussed with respect to Congress,44  builds on an earlier recommendation for agency practice 
developed in the wake of a controversial D.C. Circuit opinion and widely implemented.45  
Remarkably (and perhaps expectably) from Prof. Heinzerling’s perspective, it “ does not address 
ex parte communications in the executive review process,  including before the Office of  
Information  and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)46 ... [or] interagency  communications  outside  the  
process  of executive review.”  Nor does it voice any concern with extra-governmental contacts 
during the pre-notice period, the contacts that so exercise Professor Pierce.  Indeed, building on a 
directive of the Clinton administration,47
                                                 
43  79 Fed. Reg. 35,993 (June 25, 2014) 
 it explicitly recommends: “4.   Agencies should not 
44  See text at n,  above. 
45  Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommendation 77-3, Ex Parte Communications in Informal 
Rulemaking Proceedings, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,253 (Oct. 5, 1977), adopted in response to the D.C. Circuit’s 
groundbreaking  decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F. 2d 9, (D.C. Cir.1977).  See Nathaniel L. 
Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 
ADMIN. L.REV. 377,  377 (1978). 
46  See Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommendation 88-9, Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking, 
54 Fed.  Reg.  5207  (Feb.  2,  1989);  Admin.  Conf.  of  the  United  States,  Recommendation  80-6,  
Intragovernmental  Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,407 (Dec. 31, 1980) 
[This is Fn. 11 in the original.] 
47  In the prefatory discussion, ACUS explains “Before an agency issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM), few if any restrictions on ex parte communications are desirable.7  [7)Recognizing these principles, the 
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impose restrictions on ex parte communications before an NPRM is issued.“   
 Professor Heinzerling’s concern with secretive White House political influence was quite 
strikingly absent from the third of these recommendations, “Science in the Administrative 
Process,” Recommendation 2013-3.48  Here, ACUS’s consultant, Professor Wendy Wagner, had 
undertaken a study addressing the assurance of integrity in agency science.  Integrity in 
government science had armed President Obama’s 2008 campaign, characterized his very first 
message to agency officials upon taking office,49 and had also informed her prior scholarly work, 
strikingly supportive of President Obama’s stated concerns, during the preceding Bush 
administration.50
                                                                                                                                                             
Clinton Administration directed agencies “to review all . . . administrative ex parte rules and eliminate any that 
restrict communication prior to the publication of a proposed rule,” with the limited exception of “rules requiring the 
simple disclosure of the time, place, purpose, and participants of meetings.”  See Memorandum  for  Heads  of  
Departments  and  Agencies,  Regulatory  Reinvention  Initiative  (Mar.  4,  1995),  available  at  
http://www.acus.gov/memoran-dum/regulatory-reinvention-initiative-memo-1995.  This memorandum, which has 
never been revoked, continues to inform agency practice.]   Communications during this early stage of the process 
are less  likely  to  pose  the  harms  described  above  and  can  help  an  agency  gather  essential information,  craft  
better  regulatory  proposals,  and  promote  consensus  building  among  interested persons.” 
  Supported by numerous interviews and other indications, her report to ACUS 
raised significant issues of OIRA interventions continuing in President Obama’s administration, 
interventions that appeared to bear importantly on her study’s concern with assuring the integrity 
of government science.  ACUS officials resisted this empirical element of her study, at first 
requiring her to revisit these issues, providing greater and confirming detail.  This, she did.  They 
48  78 Fed. Reg. 41,357 (July 10, 2013). 
49  Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009).  
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then refused to use her findings as an element in constructing the Conference recommendations 
drawing on her study.  These recommendations provided useful suggestions to agencies how 
they might structure their internal processes to support scientific integrity in their work.  
Strikingly, though, it made no recommendations about intra-governmental influence arguably 
aimed at “bending science,” and this despite the consultant’s report of OIRA interventions.  Not 
a word would be said to OIRA, despite the empirical findings she had made, that were 
strengthened after ACUS had instructed her to revisit the issue.  Such sensitivity about speaking 
to agency overseers, perhaps especially those in the executive branch, seems so often to 
characterize ACUS’s work.  
 Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review, Statement 18,51
                                                                                                                                                             
50  Tom McGarrity and Wendy Wagner, Bending Science (2008). 
 is addressed to what 
had become a notorious failure of OIRA to honor its promises of expedition in performing its 
impact analysis reviews under Section 6 of E.O. 12866 – again, primarily occurring during the 
pre-notice period.  Here, the phenomenon could not be gainsaid, however much OIRA’s 
representatives on the ACUS Council might have wished that.  ACUS did speak directly and 
critically to OIRA, albeit in the mild, context-sensitive form of a “statement,” not the usual 
“recommendations.”  Here, consultant Curtis Copeland, a veteran of both the General 
Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service, and so well positioned to learn what 
for others might be swept under the rug, reported in detail about the extensive delays OIRA had 
caused in rulemaking during the pendency of President Obama’s campaign for a second term.  
Professor Heinzerling substantially relies on his study to support her indictment of the departures 
51  78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013).. 
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presidential oversight has produced from the classical administrative law view of rulemaking.  
During the run-up to the 2012 presidential election, OIRA not only sat on draft impact statements 
submitted to it for periods that, on average, essentially doubled the maximum period the 
executive order promises for their consideration; by informal means it also saw to it that some 
drafts would not be submitted, so that that clock would not start to run.52  Although ACUS’s 
leadership used the study to produce only a “statement,” not recommendations, it was clear that 
criticism had been offered.  The statement earned detailed coverage, not usual for ACUS’s work, 
in the Washington Post.53
 One hopes that Copeland’s study will mark a turning point for ACUS, and that the empirical 
studies it supports will now more frequently consider oversight relations within the executive 
branch.  That they occurred so infrequently during ACUS’s first lifetime is perhaps not so 
surprising; although the growth of presidential administration began in the 1970's, as Professor 
Heinzerling’s concern with Sierra Club v. Costle reflects, its emergence as a dominant concern 
of the administrative and constitutional law literature has been more recent.  “Presidential 
Administration” appeared six years after ACUS suspended operations, defunded, in 1995.  So 
one might reasonably believe that only since its revival four years ago has a need for such studies 
  
                                                 
52  His re-election has somewhat moderated, but not eliminated the problem.  In a recent email, Mr. Copeland 
reported that a recent look at the OIRA website revealed, “as of today, there were there were 119 rules under review 
at OIRA.  Of those, 44 had been under review for more than 90 days, including 17 for more than six months.  Eleven 
have been at OIRA since at least 2012, and seven since at least 2011 (including one since 2010).  Email to the 
author, July 10, 2014. 
53  Juliet Eilperin, “White House delayed enacting rules ahead of 2012 election to avoid controversy” (Dec. 13, 
2014), available at http://wapo.st/1hTTmFU (visited July 16, 2014). 
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become so apparent.  Yet the current debates about the nature and proper dimensions of 
“presidential administration,” the ongoing and important oversight relationships involved in the 
work of the GAO and inspectors general, the enduring supervisory relationships created by the 
Small Business and Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
Department of Justice administration of the Freedom of Information Act (and the newly created 
Office of Government Information Services), General Services Administration and Office of 
Personnel Management controls over materiel and staffing, the administration of computer 
services under the government’s Chief Information Officer – all these raise issues common to the 
agencies ACUS serves, and on all of them disciplined empirical work leading to 
recommendations presented to the ACUS Assembly could add importantly to public 
understanding, and to the efficiency and fairness of government operations. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
